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INTRODUCTION

The majority of states, including West Virginia, recognize a husband's or wife's cause of action for loss of consortium in both in
injury and wrongful death cases.' This cause of action lies in the
impairment of the non-injured spouse's right to the society, affection,
assistance, conjugal fellowship and sexual relations of the injured
spouse. 2 Due largely to the nature of the claim, consortium actions

1. Donald L. Dionne, Note, Tort-Law - Minors Have Independent Cause of Action for Loss
of ParentalConsortium Resulting from Injury Inflicted Upon a Parent by Negligent Third Party.
Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, 18 Cums. L. REv. 473, 480 (1986).
2. W. PAGE KEETON, ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON TlE LAW OF TORTS § 125 (5th ed.

1984).
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have been historically limited to spouses. 3 In 1980, however, a trend
began to expand consortium claims to include a cause of action for
the impairment of a child's relationship with the parent. Although
recognized by only nine states, this cause of action is gaining momentum. West Virginia has recently joined the distinct minority of
states which recognizes a child's cause of action for loss of consortium in a nonfatal injury case. 4 This note analyzes the reasoning
behind the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in Belcher v. Goins. It also discusses some of the major points
of contention upon which the majority of courts base their rejection
of the cause of action. It concludes by agreeing with the Court's
decision, but points out some of the questions and problems that
have plagued the recognition of a child's claim for loss of consortium
which were not fully addressed by the court.

II.

FACTS

The mother of the plaintiff, Stephanie L. Belcher, was injured
when the car she was driving was negligently struck head-on by a
car driven by the defendant. At the time of the collision, the plaintiff
was over eighteen years of age, but resided in her mother's home.
Although the plaintiff was not in or near the car at the time of the
accident, the plaintiff sought recovery from the defendant for "loss
of love, companionship, and consortium of and from her mother,"
for mental anguish and for nursing and household services provided
by the plaintiff to her mother after her mother was injured. The
defendant moved to dismiss the claim for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. The trial court denied the motion
and ruled that a child has a claim for loss of consortium and mental
anguish against a tort-feasor for injuries negligently inflicted on the
parent. The age of the child, the circuit court held, was irrelevant,
provided that the child lived with the injured parent. Further, the
circuit court held that the child may also recover for the value of
the nursing and domestic services provided by the child to a parent
as a result of the injury. The defendant appealed the decision. 5
3. Id. at 935.

4. Belcher v. Goins, 400 S.E.2d 830 (W. Va. 1990).
5. Id. at 833.
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III.

HOLDING BY THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA

Although the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia rejected
this particular plaintiff's claim due to her age, the court upheld the
circuit court's recognition of a child's independent cause of action
for loss of consortium due to the tortious injury of a parent by a
third person. The court held that parental consortium refers to the
intangible benefits arising from the relationship between a minor child
and the child's natural or adoptive parents. Consortium includes:
society, companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and advice
of such parent and protection, care and assistance provided by the
parent. The court noted that consortium also includes, consistent
with West Virginia's wrongful death statute, sorrow and mental an6
guish concerning the impairment of the relationship.
The court limited the claim to minor children and physically or
mentally handicapped persons of any age who are dependent upon
their natural or adoptive parent physically, emotionally and financially. The injuries to the parent, however, must be serious in nature,
7
thereby severely damaging the parent-child relationship.
Damages for which the child may claim recovery do not include
the loss of financial support of the parent; nor do they include,
contrary to the lower court's holding, the value of nursing, domestic
or household services provided by the child to the injured parent.
Damages recoverable by the child encompass only the nonpecuniary
elements constituting parental consortium. The court stated that the
relevant factors to be considered in determining amount of damages
include, but are not limited to, the child's age, the nature of the
child's relationship with the parent, the child's emotional and physical characteristics, and whether other consortium-giving relationships
are available to the child.8
Procedurally, the court required that a child's claim for loss of
parental consortium be joined with the parent's claim against the

6. Id. at 834.
7. Id.at 841.
8. Id.at 841-43.
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alleged tortfeasor if feasible. Further, any percentage of comparative
contributory negligence attributable to the parent will reduce the
amount of the child's recovery. 9

The court overruled Wallace v. Wallace ° (refusing to recognize
a cause of action for alienation of affection) to the extent it is inconsistent with the holdings in this case. Most importantly, the court
made the principles of this opinion fully retroactive to cases in which
the parent's action for physical injuries has already been decided or
adjudicated. In order to prevent stale claims, however, the court did
require that the injuries must have been inflicted no more than two
years prior and the claim must be brought within thirty days of the
filing of the opinion. 1

IV.

HISTORIcAL DEVELOPMENT OF CONSORTIUM CLAIMS

Early common law recognized an action by a master for the negligent injury of his servant.' 2 This action was allowed in order not
only to protect the property of the master, but also to compensate
him for the services that he was forced to forego. 3 By 1619, this
theory was extended, by analogy, to the family.1 4 At that time, a
husband had an action to recover for the loss of marital services
due to his wife's injuries caused by the tortious actions of another
as well as for the loss of the services of his children due to their
tortious injury.'15 Other family members, however, had no such rights.
This was due to the doctrine of "paterfamilias" which dates back
to Roman times. This doctrine vested all rights of the family in the
father. 16 This being the case, the courts refused to recognize any
action in which he was not joined. The result was that the wife and
the children were, at least in this area of the law, regarded as servants
7
of the husband/father.'
9. Id. at 842.
10. 184 S.E.2d 327 (w. Va. 1971).
11. Belcher, 400 S.E.2d at 841-43.
12. KEETON et. al., supra note 2, at 931.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Dionne, supra note I, at 476.
16. David P. Dwork, Note, The Child's Right to Sue for Loss of a Parent's Love, Care and
Companionship Caused by Tortious Injury to the Parent, 56 B.U.L. REV. 722, 724 (1976).
17. Id.
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Recovery in these actions by a husband, although labeled compensation for loss of services, was quickly recognized as compensation for the loss of sexual relations, society and affection. 8 These
"services" became labeled "consortium.'' 9 And although the wife
would lose these same services if her husband were injured, she had
no claim because under the law the husband owed the wife none of
these services. 20
This obvious discrimination was followed by the early American
common law, and it was not until the twentieth century that this
injustice was remedied. 21 In the 1950 landmark case of Hitaffer v.
Argonne Co., the circuit court of the District of Columbia held that
a wife may recover under a cause of action for the loss of her husband's consortium. West Virginia, as well as the majority of states,
now recognizes a wife's cause of action for loss of consortium. 2
Courts have not, however, shown much willingness to extend recovery for loss of consortium to unmarried consorts or even to consorts when the injury occurred before marriage. 24 Courts have
emphasized that the claim is derived from the marital relationship
and the rights attendant upon it.25
Although a father could recover for the loss of his child's services
in the seventeenth century, he had ho right to recover for the loss
of society and affection when his child was tortiously injured. 26 This
also was not changed until the twentieth century. In 1975, the Wisconsin Supreme Court allowed parents to pursue a claim for loss of
filial consortium in Shockley v. Prier.27 In Shockley, the parents of
18. KEETON et al., supra note 2, at 931.

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Dionne, supra note 1, at 479.
22. 183 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950), overruled on other
grounds, sub nom. Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S.
914 (1957).
23. See King v. Bittinger, 231 S.E.2d 239 (f. Va. 1976); W. VA. CODE § 48-3-19a (1969) (A
married woman may sue and recover for loss of consortium to the same extent and in all cases as
a married man).
24. KEETON et al., supra note 2, at 932.
25. Id.
26. Dionne, supra note 1, at 481. See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 701, cmt. h (1938).
27. 225 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1975).
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an infant son sued two doctors and a hospital for loss of consortium
due to injuries sustained by their son. 28 West Virginia has not yet
expanded the scope of liability in this area.
Despite progress in the law protecting the rights of a wife to
spousal consortium and the parents to filial consortium, there has
been slow recognition of a child's right to protection of parental
consortium. 29 States had been willing to protect a child from intentional interference with the parent-child relationship by providing an
action for alienation of affection. However, most of these statutes
have now been abolished.30 A child's only protection from negligent
interference with the parent-child relationship now comes under
wrongful death statutes." Most states, including West Virginia, allow
a surviving spouse, child, or other dependent to recover for loss of
consortium when a parent is tortiously killed. 32 Damages for which
family members can recover under West Virginia's wrongful death
statute include "sorrow, mental anguish, and solace which may include society, companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and
advice of the decedent ... compensation for reasonably expected
loss of ... services, protection, care and assistance provided by the

decedent

. . . .

33

A child's right to parental consortium is widely

protected in the case of a wrongful death of a parent, but not in
the case of a non-fatal injury to a parent.
Despite this obvious inequity, courts that considered the issue of
a child's cause of action for loss of parental consortium prior to
1980 unanimously rejected such a cause of action.3 4 Of approximately
thirty-four states in which the appellate courts have considered the
issue, twenty-five states have refused to recognize a cause of action
for a child's loss of parental consortium. 35 The Restatement of Torts,

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 496.
Dionne, supra note 1, at 483. See also KETON et. al., note 2, at 935.
Dwork, infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
Dionne, supra note 1, 3.
Id.
W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6(a)(1)(A) and (B)(ii) (1989).
Dionne, supra note 1, at 483; KEETON et al., supra note 2, at 935-36.

35. Opinions of state appellate courts refusing to recognize a common-law claim for loss or
impairment of parental consortium in a nonfatal injury case include the following: Gray v. Suggs,
728 S.W.2d 148 (Ark. 1987); Lewis v. Rowland, 701 S.W.2d 122 (Ark. 1985); Borer v. American
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which pre-dates all of the minority opinions, also rejects the cause
of action. 6 In 1980, however, the Massachusetts Supreme Court in
Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell Sons, Inc., became the first court to
protect the rights of children to their parents' love, affection and
guidance. 7 In reaching its decision, the court recognized, among other
things, the similarity of a wife's loss of consortium and that of a
child, and found no justification for protecting the former and not
the latter.3 8 This line of reasoning is one of the most common found
39
in the minority decisions.

Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, (Cal. 1977) (en banc); Lee v. Colorado Department of Health, 718 P.2d
221, 233-34 (Colo. 1986) (en banc), as modified on denial of reh'g; Hinde v. Butler, 408 A.2d 668,
670 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979) (wrongful death action, but apparently also applicable to cases involving
nonfatal physical injury to parent), criticized on another point, Leland v. Chawla, 467 A.2d 439
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1983); Zorzos v. Rosen, 467 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1985) (statute passed in 1988, however,
expressly authorizes recovery of damages by an "unmarried dependent" for loss or injury to parent;
W. J. Bremer Co. v. Graham, 312 S.E.2d 787 (Ga. 1984); Halberg v. Young, 41 Haw. 634 (1957).
But see Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566, 576-78 (1989) (recognizing common-law claim
by parent for loss or impairment or consortium of child in a nonfatal injury case); Van De Veire v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 533 N.E.2d 994 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Barton-Malow Co. v. Wilburn, 556
N.E.2d 324 (Ind. 1990); Dearborn Fabricating & Engineering Corp. v. Wickman, 551 N.E.2d 1135
(Ind. 1990); Audubon-Exira Ready Mix, Inc. v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 335 N.W.2d 148, 149-52
(Iowa 1983) (wrongful death action, but in dicta court rejected common- law right to parental consortium in cases involving nonfatal physical injury to parent; however, court held that under wrongful
death or injury statute, damages for loss or impairment of parental consortium recoverable by minor
or adult children); Hoffman v. Dautel, 368 P.2d 57 (Kan. 1962); Kelly v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. 353 So. 2d 349, (La. Ct. App. 1977), appealdismissed as moot, 357 So. 2d 1144 (La.
1978); Durepo v. Fishman, 533 A.2d 264 (Me. 1987); Gaver v. Harrant, 557 A.2d 210 (Md. 1989);
Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1982); Barbera v. Brod-Dugan Co., 770 S.W.2d 318,
(Mo. Ct. App. 1989), application to transferdenied (Mo. June 13, 1989); Versland v. Caron Transport,
671 P.2d 583, 589 (Mont. 1983) (involving wrongful death, but court stated broadly that nonadopted
minor stepchildren have no claim for deprivation of "parental" consortium); General Electric Co.
v. Bush, 498 P.2d 366 (Nev. 1972); Russell v. Salem Transportation Co., 295 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1972);
DeAngelis v. Lutheran Medical Center, 445 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1981), aff'd mem., 449 N.E.2d 406 (N.Y.
1983); Vaughn v. Clarkson, 376 S.E.2d 236 (N.C. 1989) (per curiam); Morgel v. Winger, 290 N.W.2d
266 (N.D. 1980); Sanders v. Mt. Sinai Hospital, 487 N.E.2d 588 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985); Norwest v.
Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital, 652 P.2d 318 (Or. 1982); Schroeder v. Ear, Nose & Throat
Associates of Lehigh Valley, Inc., 557 A.2d 21 (Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 567 A.2d 653 (Pa.
1989); Still v. Baptist Hospital Inc., 755 S.W.2d 807 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). Belcher v. Goins, 400
S.E.2d 830, 934 n.5 (W. Va. 1990).
36. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 707A (1976).
37. 413 N.E.2d 690, 703 (Mass. 1980).
38. Id. at 693-94.
39. The following are opinions of state appellate courts recognizing a common-law claim for
loss or impairment of parental consortium in a nonfatal injury case: Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay
Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991 (Alaska 1987) (minor children; "tortiously inflicted" injuries upon parent,
even when parent is not so severely injured as to be in a vegetative state); Villareal v. State Department
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The twenty-five courts (hereinafter the majority courts) that have
refused to recognize this cause of action have all based their decisions

on like reasoning. The most common reasons given by these courts
include: (1) the weight of precedent refuses to recognize such a claim;
(2) courts should defer to the legislature in this area; (3) the lack of
historical social and legal policy supporting a parental consortium

action in contrast to that supporting wrongful death actions; (4) the
dissimilarities between the husband/wife relationship and the parent/
child relationship; (5) double recovery; (6) multiplicity of actions; (7)
difficulty of assessing the amount of damages; (8) increased liability
insurance costs; (9) adverse effect on family relations; and (10) exposure to potentially unlimited liability.4 0
In Belcher v. Goins, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia addressed each of these arguments and, finding each of them
unpersuasive, became only the tenth court to recognize a child's action for loss of consortium. Although persuasive at times, the court's
reasoning leaves some questions unanswered.

V.

ANALYSIS

A.

Weight of Precedent
The West Virginia Court began its analysis by stating that it was
"more concerned with the persuasiveness of the precedent than with

of Transportation, 774 P.2d 213 (Ariz. 1989) (minor and adult children; parent's physical injuries
must be so serious and permanently disabling as to destroy or nearly destroy parent/child relationship);
Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690, 691-96 (Mass. 1980) (first state court of
last resort to recognize such a claim; minor children with parent "seriously" injured); Morgan v.
Lalumiere, 493 N.E.2d 206, 211 (Mass. App. Ct.) (Ferriterextended to physically or mentally handicapped adult child residing with physically injured parent and who was dependent upon parent physically, emotionally and financially), review denied, 497 N.E.2d 1096 (Mass. 1986); Berger v. Weber,
303 N.W.2d 424 (Mich. 1981) (only minor children, apparently; expressly not limited to instances of
"severely" injured parents), aff'g as modified, 267 N.W.2d 124 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (first state
appellate court to recognize such acclaim); Salings v. Ft. Worth Cab & Baggage Co., 725 S.W.2d
701, 702-04 (Tex. 1987) (apparently recognizing such claim of minor children; their father abandoned
his wife and minor children after wife/mother was sexually assaulted), but see Vaughn v. Reagan,
784 S.W.2d 88, 90-92 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (not viewing Salinas as providing "a clear-cut mandate"),
writ of errorgranted (Tex. Mar. 28, 1990); Hay v. Medical Center Hospital, 496 A.2d 939 (Vt. 1985)
(minor children); Velcd v. Pengo Hydro-Pull Corp., 691 P.2d 190 (1984) (en banc) (expressly not
limited to minor children because injury would fix appropriate damages for adult children; "tortiously
injured" parent); Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1984) (expressly limited to minor
children; negligently injured parent); Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County Joint Powers Fire Board, 797
P.2d 1171 (Wyo. 1990) (minor children; "tortiously inflicted" injuries upon parent); Craft v. Hermes
Consolidated, Inc., 797 P:2d 559 (Wyo. 1990) (following Nulle). Belcher, 400 S.E.2d at 836 n.6.
40. Belcher v. Goins, 400 S.E.2d 830, 837 (W. Va. 1990).
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the weight of the precedent."41 Setting the tone for the entire opinion,
the court borrowed a statement from the Wisconsin court in Theama
v. City of Kenosha,42 which also recognized this cause of action, by
stating "[o]ur oath is to do justice, not perpetuate error." 43 The
Court was not to be moved by the clear trend that had been established in this area of tort law.
B. Deference to the Legislature
Regarding deference to the legislature, the Court pointed out that
since the spousal claim to consortium was judicially created, and the
spousal claim is analogous to parental consortium claims, courts have
the inherent power to evolve common law in this area as society
changes .44
Although Maine's highest court in Durepo v. Fishman45 also recognized its right to expand the common law in this area, that court
refused to recognize this cause of action. The Maine court found
that this decision to expand liability to indemnify children in a parent's non-fatal injury was a question that should be left to the legislature. 46 The court reasoned that "judicial decree [in this area] is
no substitute for the exhaustive gathering of socio-economic facts
and the public debate upon the import of those facts that would
occur before the Maine Legislature enacted so sweeping an embellishment on . .. existing tort law . . . . "47 As an example of the
"practical wisdom of leaving to the legislature the line-drawing job
of defining the scope of tort liability in this area," the Maine court
pointed to its wrongful death statute. 48 The West Virginia court gave
no reason why it was better for it to resolve this issue than the
legislature.

41. Id.
42. 344 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1984).
43. Belcher, 400 S.E.2d at 837-38 (quoting Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513, 518

(Wis. 1984)).
44. Id. at 838.
45.
46.
47.
48.

533 A.2d 264 (Me. 1987).
Id. at 264-65.
Id. at 265.
Id. 265-66.
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C. Similarity to Social Policy Behind Wrongful Death Statutes
Along the same lines as the preceding argument, many of the
minority courts, as well as the West Virginia court, argue that legislatures, by explicitly protecting a child's right to consortium in a
wrongful death case, have implicitly protected a child's right to consortium in an injury case.4 9 This "legal entitlement" theory is based
on the sympathetic and logical argument that a child's loss of love,
care, companionship, and guidance is nearly the same whether the
parent dies or is seriously injured. These courts seem to indicate that
the legislature would be acting underinclusively and arbitrarily by
drawing a distinction between children whose parents are killed and
those whose parents are injured. 0
As one of the leading cases rejecting this cause of action points
out, however, this reasoning ignores the historical and legal principles
upon which wrongful death statutes are based. 5' The California court
in Borer v. American Airlines, Inc. explained that wrongful death
statutes were enacted to give the heirs of a deceased victim a cause
of action enabling them to pursue the tortfeasor.5 2 Under the common law, heirs had no such action.53 This being the case, a tortfeasor
54
could escape liability "for his action" so long as the victim died.
This problem, however, does not exist in an injury case. The injured
party retains a cause of action and the tortfeasor cannot escape liability.5 The existence of a child's cause of action is not needed to
punish the tortfeasor in an injury case.5 6 It follows then, that the
creation of a child's cause of action in this setting is not supported
by the social policies behind the creation of the wrongful death statute.
The California Court also pointed out that wrongful death statutes expanded the scope of recovery from pecuniary damages to
49.
50.
51.
v. Pengo
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Belcher, 400 S.E.2d 830, 836 (W. Va. 1990).
See Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690, 695 (Mass. 1980); Ueland
Hydra-Pull Corp., 691 P.2d 190, 192 (Wash. 1984) (en banc).
Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1977) (en bane).
Id. at 865.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 866.
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include damages for loss of affection and society.57 This was done
because limiting damages solely to pecuniary losses would frequently
bar the heirs from any recovery whatsoever if they failed to prove
such losses. 8 This was the result particularly if the deceased victim
was a child, an elderly parent, or a non-working spouse who did
not contribute measurable amounts of income to the family. 9 The
court felt, however, that this would not occur in an injury case because the child's loss, both in terms of financial support and love
and affection, is taken into consideration by the jury in the parent's
claimA0 Again, it would appear that the historical and legal policies
behind wrongful death statutes do not support the theory that the
passage of these statues implicitly supports the creation of a parental
consortium claim.
D. Similarities Between Consortium Claims
The West Virginia Court goes on to suggest that the similarities
between parental and spousal consortium also give this new cause
of action legal entitlement. 61 The court found that the only real difference between the two relationships "is the lack of sexual relations
and this single distinction is not significant enough to deny this important cause of action." 62 This argument by analogy, although persuasive, ignores many of the policy reasons behind the initial
recognition of a spouse's claim for loss of consortium. As the Minnesota Court pointed out when it considered this issue in Salin v.
Kloempken, a spousal action is based not only on the loss of sexual
services but also on the loss of child bearing opportunity.63
Courts have also noted that the parent/child relationship, although important, is not a legally recognized entity.64 It is this legal
entity of marriage, viewed as a "united" whole, provides the basis
57. Id.

58. Id. at 865.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id.
Belcher v. Goins, 400 S.E.2d 830, 838 (,V. Va. 1990).
Id.
322 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Minn. 1982).
Gaver v. Harrant, 557 A.2d 210, 218 (Md. 1989).
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upon which the wife was given the right to base her recovery. 6 This
argument, although in keeping with precedent, is not supportable.
The mere existence or non-existence of a legally recognized relationship is not of such importance that a child's right to recover for
a meaningful loss should be denied.
E. Double Recovery
The Court also rejected the majority argument that recognizing
a parental consortium would lead to double recovery. 6 The courts
rejecting the parental consortium claim observed that juries already
award damages for loss of impairment of parental consortium in a
non-fatal injury case as an undisclosed part of the parents' recovery
of non-economic damages. 67 The creation of a child's cause of action
in this area would unjustly allow a child to recover twice.6 8 Ironically,
the West Virginia court stated that this argument actually supports
the recognition of a child's separate cause of action because this
method of compensating a child is judicially inefficient.6 9 The Court
stated that establishing two separate causes of action and limiting
the injured parent's recovery to the loss of the parent's pecuniary
ability to support the child and limiting the child's recovery to loss
of parental society will not only end double recovery but also enhance
judicial efficiency. 70 This, the Court states, would be more efficient
because "rather than having juries make blind calculations of the
minor child's loss in determining an award to the parent, the minor
child's loss would be argued openly in court and the jury'7 would be
ifistructed to consider the minor child's loss separately." '
This argument, however, side steps the majority's actual view on
double recovery. Those courts point out that if children are recovering for the loss of parental consortium under their injured parent's
65.
66.
67.
Russell v.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Belcher, 400 S.E.2d 830, 838 (W. Va. 1990).
Norwest v. Presbyterian Inter Community Hosp., 652 P.2d 318, 321 (Or. 1982) (citing
Salem Trans. Co., 295 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1972)).
Id.
Belcher, 400 S.E.2d at 838.
Id.
Id.
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claim, then the goal of protecting the child has been reached; establishing a child's independent cause of action will neither solve nor
add anything meaningful. 72 If anything more is needed, some majority opinions would advocate the more practical approach of using
73
a jury instruction directing the jury to consider the loss to the child.
This, the majority courts contend, will enhance judicial efficiency,
if necessary, in a less cumbersome manner. The California court in
Borer, however, rejects the jury instruction solution: "To ask the
jury, even under carefully drafted instructions, to distinguish the loss
to the mother from her inability to care for her children from the
loss to the children from the mother's inability to care for them may
be asking too much." 74
The minority courts' argument is much more persuasive than that
of the majority in this area. This is particularly so since we do not
know for certain if juries are indeed considering children in their
award of damages. If a child's loss of a parent's companionship is
worthy of recovery, as both the majority and minority opinions seem
to agree, then a method of recovery should be implemented which
assures that compensation is being given, rather than leaving it to
chance.
F. Multiplicity of Actions
The West Virginia Court also rejected the arguments that this
cause of action will lead to multiplicity of actions; defendants will
be unfairly subjected to numerous and, in some cases, delayed claims.
Virtually all courts recognizing this claim, including the West Virginia
Court, remedy this defect by simply requiring that the child join the
claim for loss of parental consortium with the parent's injury claim
if feasible. 75 This solution may seem relatively ideal on its face, but
it has fundamental problems. First, the court did not fully discuss
the possible roadblock created to such joinder of claims by the West

72.
73.
74.
75.

Norwest v. Presbyterian Inter. Community Hosp., 652 P.2d 318, 321 (Or. 1982).
Borer v. American Air Lines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 860 (Cal. 1977) (en banc).
Id.
Belcher, 400 S.E.2d 830, 839 (,V. Va. 1990).
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Virginia Code. West Virginia, like many states, tolls the statute of
limitations during minority. 76 This would mean that a tortfeasor who
injured the parent of a two-year-old child may have a claim brought
against him by that child sixteen years later. Although the West Virginia Court states it will require joinder of parental consortium claims,
it appears from various majority view opinions facing this same issue
that hurdling this roadblock may require more than a mere judicial
decision. 77 Some courts suggest that it would instead require a legislative enactment creating a uniform statute of limitations period
for both the parent's action for personal injury and the child's action
for loss of parental consortium. 78 The West Virginia Court gave the
impression that by mandating this requirement in its decision it could
override the need for any legislation. It is unclear if this is indeed
the case.
G.

CalculatingDamages

The Court quickly dismissed the majority's argument against recognition of the claim because of the difficulty in assessing the amount
of damages. 79 The Court aptly points out that the job of the factfinder in calculating damages is difficult in any case and would be
no more difficult in a parental consortium case.80
Notably, the Court set out some of the factors that the jury may
consider in assessing damages. These include: the child's age, the
nature of the child's relationship with the parent, the child's emotional and physical characteristics, and whether other consortiumgiving relationships are available to the child. 81 These factors are
apparently intended to help a jury focus on the specific needs and
injuries of each child in each case.
The difficulty in assessing damages was important, however, in
Gaver v. Harrant,82 where Maryland's Supreme Court of Appeals
76. W. VA. CODE § 55-2-15 (1989).
77. See Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1982); Dearborn, Fabracating &
Engig Corp. v. Workham, 551 N.E.2d 1135, 1137 (Ind. 1990).
78. See supra note 77.
79. Belcher, 400 S.E.2d at 839.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 842.
82. 557 A.2d 210, 214-15 (Md. 1989).
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refused to recognize the parental consortium claims. It noted that
considerations such as difficulty in assessing damages may not deter
a court from compensating a primary victim, but become a more
significant factor when the plaintiff is a secondary victim who has
suffered no physical injury.83 This is, the court stated, because of
the few instances in tort law where a secondary tort victim has been
permitted to recover only for a negligently inflicted injury to a relational interest.8 4 This argument is sound, but, in West Virginia,
unpersuasive since our Court has recognized a claim for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress without the requirement of physical
injury. 5
The opinion goes on to
etary compensation will not
of society, companionship,
consin Court's response in
gument:

answer the related argument that monenable the minor child to regain the loss
and the like.8 6 It agreed with the WisTheama v. City of Kenosha to this ar-

Although a monetary award may be a poor substitute for the loss of a parent's
society and companionship, it is the only workable way that our legal system has
found to ease the injured party's tragic loss. We recognize this as a shortcoming
to our society, yet we believe that allowing such an award is clearly preferable to
completely denying recovery2'

The California Court in Borer, as well as other majority courts,
was not so easily swayed by this sympathetic appeal into expanding
the scope of consortium in tort actions.88 The Borer court stated:
To say that plaintiffs have been "compensated" for their loss is superficial; in
reality they have suffered a loss for which they can never be compensated ....
Monetary compensation will not enable plaintiffs to regain the companionship and
guidance of a mother; it will simply establish a fund so that upon reaching adulthood, when plaintiffs will be less in need of maternal guidance, they will be unusually wealthy men and women. 9

83. Id. at 217.
84. Id.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Toler v. Cassinelli, 41 S.E.2d 672 (%V.Va. 1946).
Belcher, 400 S.E.2d 830, 839 (W. Va. 1990).
344 N.W.2d 513, 520 (Vis. 1984).
Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 862 (Cal. 1977).
Id.
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Despite this cynical view, the West Virginia Court's reasoning is
quite sound in recognizing that recovery should not be denied a child
merely because money damages are not a substitute for a parent's
companionship. The intangibility of the loss does not make that loss
any less real.
H.

Social Costs

The Court was also unswayed by the many arguments made by
majority courts concerning the effect on society by this expansion
of liability. 9° Some of the perceived negative effects would be: increases in insurance costs, the accompanying danger of the inability
to afford insurance due to the inflated rates, and the administrative
costs of deciding consortium claims. 9' The West Virginia Court's
opinion, like other minority courts', stated that the law will not and
should not vary with the cost of insurance. 92 Rather, it is insurance
costs that will vary with the potential liability of the law. 93
Most majority opinions would agree with the proposition that
law should not be dictated by insurance costs, but point out that a
balance must be struck and certain limits drawn. 94 One commentator
suggests that in an effort to receive larger and larger sums for secondary injuries at the tortfeasor's expense,, the injured party may be
endangering his ability to recover at all. 95 Therefore, the majority
opinion believes that lines must be drawn limiting liability. This conclusion is very persuasive if we keep in mind the argument that children are considered by juries during the parent's claim for noneconomic injuries and are compensated at that time. If this is the
case, it would be of little value to establish a separate cause of action
for a child's claim at the expense of higher insurance costs. A child
who is already protected de facto would gain nothing, but society,
on the other hand, would lose through higher insurance costs. It is

90. Belcher, 400 S.E.2d at 839.
91. See Salin v. Kloemphen, 322 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1982); DeAngelis v. Lutheran Medical
Center, 445 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1981), aff'd mem., 449 N.E.2d 406, (N.Y. 1983).
92. Belcher, 400 S.E.2d at 839.

93. Id.
94. Mazzagatti v. Everingham, 516 A.2d 672, 680 (Pa. 1986) (Flaherty, J., concurring).
95. Id.
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justifiable that the Court did not ignore this protective claim of children's rights merely on the grounds that insurance costs would increase, even in light of the modern day cost of insurance and litigious
climate.
L

Effect on Family Relationships

The ninth argument against recognition of this cause of action
is the possibility of adverse effects on the family relationship. The
argument is based on the belief that each of the minor children in
a family would attempt to magnify the quality of his or her relationship with the parent in order to enhance his or her own damage
award.9 6 Although the Belcher court recognizes the problem, it falters
in its resolution by merely stating that the same situation is present
in wrongful death actions. 97 Actually, it is a contrary distinction that
makes this majority argument unpersuasive. Since the class of claimants in a parental consortium claim is limited to children, it is less
likely that children of such a young age would be motivated by greed.
This cannot be said, however, in a wrongful death action where most
of the claimants are adults and know the enhanced value, in terms
of recovery, of magnifying the quality of their relationship with the
deceased. Further, since the claims of the children are joined with
those of the parent, it is likely that a single attorney will represent
all claims and will attempt to communicate the gravity of the family's
loss to the jury rather than argue that one child is more deserving
than another. If the situation did arise, however, where children claim
a greater share due to the quality of their relationship with the parent,
a jury would be capable of making those decisions. 98
J.

Exposure to Unlimited Liability

The last argument against the recognition of a parental consortium claim is that it will expose the tortfeasor to potentially unlimited
liability. The fear is that a claim would exist for anyone who could

96. Belcher, 400 S.E.2d at 839-40.
97. Id. at 840.
98. Id.
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claim and prove a loss or impairment of consortium because of the
close relationship with the physically injured person. 99 The California
Court in Borer v. American Airlines, Inc.,' °° pointed out the need

for line drawing to limit liability. The Court feared that recognition
of a child's claim for consortium would start a "rippling in the
water" that would lead to the recognition of claims by brothers,
sisters, in-laws, grandparents and so on. 10' This is an important consideration because, in some family situations, the relationship between other members of the family, such as a grandparent and a
grandchild or two brothers, may be as important in terms of society
and nurturing as the parent/child relationship. An argument denying
a claim seeking protection of these special relationships would be
difficult to make after recognizing the value of the parent/child relationship.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals attempted to allay
this fear in a number of ways. First, it limited the class of plaintiffs
under this action to minor children and to physically or mentally
handicapped children of any age who are dependent upon the injured
parent physically, emotionally, and financially 02 Further, the Court
mandated that the injury to the parent must be serious in nature to
the degree that it "severely" affects the "crucial role of the parent
in these vitally important relationships."'' 03 This definition, however,
leaves something to be desired, particularly considering the novelty
of these types of claims. Other courts have provided a more specific
definition. Arizona, for example, limited its holding to allow recovery
to claims only where "the parent suffers serious, permanent, disabling injuries rendering the parent unable to provide love, care, companionship, and guidance to the child.0 4 The parent's mental or
physical impairment must be so overwhelming and severe that the
parent/child relationship is destroyed or nearly destroyed."' 05 Other

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
563 P.2d 858, 862 (Cal. 1977) (en banc).
Id.
Belcher, 400 S.E.2d at 841.
Id. at 840, 841.
Villareal v. State Dept. of Trans., 774 P.2d 213, 219 (Ariz. 1989).
Id.
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states such as Vermont (parent rendered permanently comatose) 0 6
and Wisconsin (injuries to father caused very severe mental and physical injuries) 0 7 also indicate that the parent/child relationship must
be gravely affected for recovery under this claim. Although the West
Virginia Court may not desire to limit recovery to such severe injuries, it might have givepn a clearer definition considering the novelty
of this type of action in this country.
In a further attempt to limit liability, the Court states that at
this time it does not recognize an adult child's claim for loss of
parental consortium. 0 8 However, this seems to go against every argument in support of recognizing a minor child's parental consortium
claim, particularly in light of the fact that an adult child may make
a claim for loss of consortium under the wrongful death statute. 0 9
For example, Washington, one of the two jurisdictions allowing an
adult claim, did so in order to remain consistent with its wrongful
death statute, which like that of West Virginia, allows an adult child
to recover for loss of consortium.110 Further, since the West Virginia
Court found it unjust to place a higher value on the rights of a
spouse to consortium than the rights of a child to the same, it seems
contrary to its logic to hold the relationship of minor children with
their parent to be of greater value than the relationship of adult
children and their parent. It canbe argued that in the case of a very
young child, the relationship with a parent is of no greater value
than that of an adult child who is the sole caretaker, and in many
cases, the sole companion of an elderly parent. The West Virginia
Court did, however, clearly leave the door open for a possible claim
by an adult child."'
VI.

CONCLUSION

Although the West Virginia Court effectively refuted the main

contentions given by the majority courts in refusing to recognize a
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Hay v. Medical Center Hosp., 496 A.2d 939 (Vt. 1985).
Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1984).
Belcher, 400 S.E.2d 830, 840 (V. Va. 1990).
W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6 (1989).
Ueland v. Pengo Hydra-Pull Corp., 691 P.2d 190 (Wash. 1984) (en banc).
Belcher, 400 S.E.2d at 840.
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child's parental consortium claim, its reasoning left some questions
unanswered. Most importantly, the Court did not address the rights
of a child who is not born at the time of the action but whose
relationship with the parent will be affected by a permanently disabling injury to the parent. It would appear that because the Court
required a parental consortium claim to be joined with the parent's
injury claim, these children are barred from recovery. This Court,
as well as the other minority courts, must realize that the unborn
child's relationship with a parent has been tragically affected in the
same manner as the existing child's. An allowance of recovery for
these later born children is only logical given the basic motivations
for recognizing this cause of action protecting a child's right to have
a normal nurturing relationship with a parent.
Despite these unanswered questions, the Court's decision is sound.
This is particularly true when one considers the interest that is being
protected. Whether it is in fact a reality that children in the past have
recovered for loss of consortium under their parent's claim, there is
little harm either judicially or socially in taking the step the West
Virginia Court chose. It merely recognizes and assures that a child's
rights will be considered by a jury as a distinct element of damages.
Although it is unlikely that damage awards will increase significantly
from a practitioner's standpoint, this decision protects and compensates a child in those cases where there has been a real loss.
Daniel T. Yon
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